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KEEPING SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ALIVE:  
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO OUTLAWING 
DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS IN DELAWARE 
Danielle A. Rapaccioli* 
 
Current trends in shareholder activism have brought to light the 
competing interests of management and stockholders.  With a rise in 
shareholder activism, firms are continuing to include change in control 
provisions, known as proxy puts, in their debt agreements to counter 
activist success.  Recent litigation regarding the use of these provisions has 
created a debate as to whether these provisions are valid under Delaware 
law.  Moreover, companies and lending institutions have morphed these 
provisions into a more restrictive form, known as “dead hand proxy puts.”  
The controversy analyzed in this Note arises out of the use of dead hand 
proxy puts in debt agreements. 
The Delaware Chancery Court has considered the issue of proxy puts in 
three recent cases.  On no occasion has the court declared traditional or 
dead hand proxy puts invalid; the court, however, expressed skepticism 
toward these provisions.  With a recognized entrenchment effect on 
management and a deterrent effect on the stockholder franchise, the court 
indicated that they could potentially be invalid in Delaware as a matter of 
public policy. 
This Note considers the rise of shareholder activism in the United States 
and the use of both proxy puts and poison pills to defend against activist 
investors and hostile takeovers.  It analyzes the current debate over dead 
hand proxy puts and compares these provisions to the already illegal dead 
hand poison pills.  It ultimately argues that dead hand proxy puts should be 
outlawed in Delaware on the same basis as dead hand poison pills. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Like an ‘imperial’ chairman you have taken steps to entrench yourself 
that we believe to be unconscionable,” wrote Carl Icahn to Joseph Cook, 
the Chairman of the Board of Amylin Pharmaceuticals.1  Icahn, one of the 
largest shareholders of Amylin, scoffed at Cook’s dictatorial management 
style.2  In doing so, he addressed Amylin’s defense mechanisms, which 
were standing in the way of a proxy fight—a poison pill and two proxy puts 
found in the company’s debt agreements.3  Icahn, hoping to enhance 
stockholder value, held Amylin up as a prime example of what is wrong 
with governance in most of corporate America and announced his intention 
to fix it.4 
Amylin had lost $5 billion in market value under current management, 
and its share price had fallen 75 percent since its peak in 2007.5  Icahn and 
Eastbourne Capital Management, a prominent activist investing firm, 
wanted control of a majority of the board.6  There was one problem—the 
company’s proxy puts prevented Icahn and Eastbourne from changing a 
majority of the board of directors.7  Specifically, the proxy puts provided 
that if a majority of Amylin’s board became comprised of “non-continuing 
directors,” the company’s debt would be accelerated and Amylin would be 
required to pay back $915 million immediately.8  Thus, if they were 
successful in gaining a majority of the board, they would trigger the proxy 
puts in the company’s debt agreements.9 
The Delaware Chancery Court recently has scrutinized dead hand proxy 
puts because of their effects on shareholders.10  With a traditional proxy 
put, such as the one in San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,11 the current board of directors has the ability to 
approve a newly elected board.12  Specifically, the traditional put allows the 
current board to give new directors status as continuing directors, 
 
 1. Letter from Carl Icahn to Joseph C. Cook, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Amylin 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/letter-
from-carl-icahn-to-amylin-pharmaceutical-inc-61824557.html [https://perma.cc/A4U8-
E5ZA]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See In Victory for Icahn, Amylin Chairman Is Ousted, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K (June 
2, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/in-victory-for-icahn-amylin-
chairman-is-ousted/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3LSK-4LWQ]. 
 6. Icahn, Amylin and the New Nuances of Activist Investing, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K 
(Apr. 20, 2009, 10:31 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com//2009/04/20/icahn-amylin-and-the-
new-nuances-of-activist-investing/ [https://perma.cc/4QZP-QWAZ]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 
310 n.7 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 9. See Icahn, Amylin and the New Nuances of Activist Investing, supra note 6. 
 10. See Amylin, 983 A.2d at 315. 
 11. 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 12. See id.; infra Part II.A. 
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preventing the proxy put from being triggered.13  A mutation of this proxy 
put includes a dead hand feature, which effectively prohibits any new 
directors from being named as continuing directors, regardless of board 
approval.14  In recent Delaware litigation, including the case brought 
against Amylin, the Delaware Chancery Court has expressed skepticism 
over the validity of these dead hand provisions.15 
Although change in control provisions have existed for decades, the 
proxy put has gained notoriety as a result of a wave of shareholder 
activism.16  Carl Icahn and other similar investors believe that these 
provisions both unlawfully entrench management and prevent them from 
properly changing a company’s strategy to enhance shareholder value.17  
Even if they believe, as in the case with Amylin, that the board of directors 
is harming the company more than helping it, activist investors are less 
likely to change the board of directors in light of the destabilizing financial 
effects the proxy contest will have on the company.18 
The Delaware Chancery Court has not outlawed dead hand proxy puts, 
but has noted that their entrenching effects on management, and value 
reducing effects on the stockholder franchise, could render them 
unenforceable as a matter of law.19  In the most recent relevant case,20 the 
Chancery Court broadly compared their effects to the effects of dead hand 
poison pills, which were outlawed in 1998.21  This Note seeks to analyze 
the legality of dead hand proxy puts.  Specifically, it provides a 
comparative analysis between dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy 
puts.  In doing so, this Note argues that the Delaware Chancery Court 
should outlaw dead hand proxy puts on the same grounds that it outlawed 
dead hand poison pills.  The dead hand feature in both defense mechanisms 
has a similar purpose and similar effects on shareholders and management.  
As a result, the Delaware Chancery Court ultimately should conclude that 
 
 13. T. Brad Davey & Christopher N. Kelly, Dead Hand Proxy ‘Puts’ Face Continued 
Scrutiny from Plaintiffs Bar, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 12, 2015), http://www.bna.com/dead-
hand-proxy-n17179927613/ [https://perma.cc/24D6-FQQZ]. 
 14. Maxwell Murphy, ‘Proxy Puts’ Invite Shareholders, Attorneys to Come Knocking, 
WALL STREET J. (June 1, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2015/06/01/proxy-puts-
invite-shareholders-attorneys-to-come-knocking/ [https://perma.cc/YKD5-BRFQ]; see infra 
Part I.B.3. 
 15. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 315 (stating that the proxy puts might be unenforceable as 
against public policy); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 80, Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. 
v. Ballantine, No. 9789-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014) (asserting that proxy puts have a 
recognized entrenchment effect and that lenders were on notice as to the potential 
unenforceability of proxy puts). 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
 17. Letter from Carl Icahn to Joseph C. Cook, Jr., supra note 1. 
 18. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 72 (discussing the effect that a 
dead hand proxy put would have on shareholders’ willingness to wage a proxy contest); see 
also DAVID WHISSEL, PERILOUS PROXY PUTS:  EMBEDDED ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES AND 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 4 (2014) (explaining that a proxy put could potentially trigger a 
liquidity crisis, which would have dramatic financial consequences for shareholders). 
 19. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 315. 
 20. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 73. 
 21. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the illegalization of dead hand poison pills in 
Delaware). 
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dead hand proxy puts are unenforceable under the Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL). 
Part I of this Note addresses the rise of shareholder activism and the 
defense mechanisms used to counter activist success.  Part II discusses 
recent Delaware litigation regarding proxy puts and provides a discussion 
of the competing interests and effects of dead hand proxy puts.  Finally, 
Part III provides a comparative analysis of the dead hand proxy put and 
dead hand poison pill and, based on this analysis, concludes that the dead 
hand proxy put should be outlawed. 
I.  SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS:  SHAKING UP CORPORATE 
BOARDROOMS ONE PROXY CONTEST AT A TIME 
This part addresses the history of shareholder activism, as well as the 
increasing influence that activist hedge funds have on corporations.  Part 
I.A discusses the rise of hedge fund activism in the United States.  Part I.B 
and Part I.C analyze proxy puts, including dead hand proxy puts, as well as 
traditional and dead hand poison pills. 
A.  Shareholder Activism 
One of the “hottest topic[s]” in corporate boardrooms today is 
shareholder activism.22  Shareholder activism is loosely defined as those 
actions taken by shareholders with the purpose of bringing about change 
within a public company, but without taking over the company.23  
Shareholder activism encompasses a number of activities that vary based on 
the investors’ desired results, as well as the timing of the intervention and 
the investors’ level of aggression in pursuing change.24  Some activist 
investors focus on changing corporate governance practices, executive 
compensation plans, or social policies.25  These investors are often less 
aggressive than activist hedge funds, whose goal is to seek significant 
change to a company’s corporate strategy, financial structure, management, 
or board of directors.26 
Activist hedge funds thus take a more assertive approach and often 
engage in offensive shareholder activism.27  “[T]he most obvious 
circumstance in which offensive shareholder activism will make sense is 
where a potential activist ascertains that a company is ‘underperforming’ 
 
 22. Sue Decker, Keeping Activist Investors at Bay:  How Corporate Boards Can Help, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/02/03/keeping-activist-
investors-at-bay-how-corporate-boards-can-help [https://perma.cc/4NLD-2Y2C]. 
 23. Paula J. Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder 
Activism, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX J. 301, 321–22 (2008); Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, 
Shareholder Activism As a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1015, 1017. 
 24. PWC, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM:  WHO, WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW? 2 (2015). 
 25. See id. at 4; Rose & Sharfman, supra note 23, at 1018. 
 26. Rose & Sharfman, supra note 23, at 1018.  This Note focuses on hedge fund 
activism, as it is the form of activism that proxy puts serve to deter. 
 27. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder 
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56–57 (2011). 
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and that it will be feasible to prompt changes in financial policy or strategic 
direction likely to increase shareholder returns.”28  Offensive shareholder 
activists accumulate a significant portion of the company’s stock for the 
purpose of forcing change.29  They traditionally target companies that are 
underperforming relative to their peers and thus are failing to maximize 
shareholder wealth.30  Once they have a stake in the company, activist 
investors may pursue public media campaigns, sponsor shareholder 
proposals, or initiate proxy contests to bring about change in the 
company.31 
Part I.A.1 and Part I.A.2 discuss, respectively, hedge fund activism in the 
United States and the debate over the utility that activists provide to 
corporations.  Then, Part I.A.3 addresses activists’ use of proxy contests as 
a strategy for gaining control over corporations. 
1.  The Rise of Hedge Fund Activism in the United States 
Shareholder activism is not a new phenomenon in the United States.32  In 
the early 1940s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a 
regulation stating that “management must allow shareholder proposals that 
constitute a ‘proper subject for action by securities holders.’”33  Shortly 
thereafter, shareholders began proposing changes to corporate structure and 
control.34  One early example of shareholder activism is attributed to 
Benjamin Graham, a well-known value investor.35  In 1947, through the 
operation of his trust company, Graham-Newman Corp., Graham 
participated in an unsuccessful campaign to obtain seats on the board of 
Bell Aircraft.36  As a result of this campaign and those that followed, 
 
 28. John H. Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, Origins of “Offensive” Shareholder Activism 
in the United States, in ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY 260 (Jonathan GS Koppell ed., 
2011). 
 29. Rose & Sharfman, supra note 23, at 1034. 
 30. See PWC, supra note 24, at 6–7. 
 31. See id. at 3–4; see also Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of 
Shareholder Activism in the United States, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM:  HEDGE 
FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS & REGULATION 40–41 (William W. Bratton & Joseph 
A. McCahery eds., 2015); infra Part I.A.3 (discussing the use of proxy contests). 
 32. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 31, at 39; see also Armour & Cheffins, supra note 
28, at 254 (discussing traces of shareholder activism dating back to the first half of the 
twentieth century). 
 33. Gillan & Starks, supra note 31, at 41.  This regulation is similar to the current Rule 
14a-8, which governs the requirements for including shareholder proposals in a company’s 
proxy materials. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998). 
 34. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 31, at 41. 
 35. Armour & Cheffins, supra note 28, at 257.  Value investors purchase stocks of 
companies that they believe the market has undervalued.  They make a profit when they 
purchase a stock at a deflated price and the price subsequently increases due to good news 
reaching the market. Value Investing, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/ 
valueinvesting.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7CGL-PMTK]. 
 36. Armour & Cheffins, supra note 28, at 257.  In 1948, Graham also solicited proxies 
from New Amsterdam Casualty Co. shareholders to improve the company’s dividend 
payout. Id. 
2016] OUTLAWING DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS 2953 
certain investors in the 1950s and 1960s gained notoriety as “proxyteers” 
for launching proxy contests for board control in U.S. public companies.37 
While there are thus traces of shareholder activism throughout the early 
twentieth century, hedge fund activism truly became prominent in the 
1980s.38  In the 1980s, an era commonly considered the “Deal Decade,” 
corporate raiders began buying up sizable portions of public companies.39  
At this time, activists mostly operated through publically traded companies, 
rather than privately controlled hedge funds, due to various restrictions 
imposed by the Investment Company Act of 1940.40  A small number of 
activists, nevertheless, chose to operate through private investment 
companies.41  These practitioners are arguably the direct antecedents to the 
high profile activist hedge funds that gained considerable notoriety in the 
2000s.42  For example, Warren Lichtenstein established a private fund, 
Steel Partners, in 1990 to buy a 9 percent interest in a steel company that he 
believed was undervalued.43  He later formed Steel Partners II, which itself 
became a prominent hedge fund in the 2000s, “with a mandate to invest in 
undervalued firms and, if necessary, to seek to fix companies to increase 
shareholder return.”44  Other individuals and institutional investors45 began 
to create similar strategies, whereby they would buy up a sizable amount of 
an undervalued company and lobby for change.46 
Hedge fund activism continued to increase throughout the 1990s, in part 
because of regulatory changes that made it easier for activists to 
 
 37. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 75. 
 38. See id. at 75–76. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. at 76–77.  The purpose of the Investment Company Act of 1940 was to protect 
the public and the interest of investors from the risks associated with investment companies. 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2012). 
 41. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 77.  An investment company generally is 
defined as “a company (corporation, business trust, partnership, or limited liability company) 
that issues securities and is primarily engaged in the business of investing in securities.” 
Investment Companies, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfinvco.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/K5SX-X3QY]. 
 42. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 77. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. An institutional investor is defined as “[s]omeone who trades large volumes of 
securities, [usually] by investing other people’s money into large managed funds.” Investor, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 46. Carl Icahn, founder of Icahn Capital Management and Icahn Partners, is another 
well-known activist investor who began as a corporate raider in the 1970s.  His investment 
philosophy entails buying up a sizeable portion of a company and promoting change, such as 
overthrowing management, reducing waste, or selling off divisions.  His goal is to increase 
shareholder value by driving up share prices and subsequently selling his stake in the 
company.  Some of his notable targets include Yahoo! and Time Warner. See Steven 
Bertoni, The Raider’s Radar, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
forbes/2011/0328/billionaires-11-profile-carl-icahn-biotech-twa-raiders-radar.html [https:// 
perma.cc/H22X-A4LN]; see also Reem Nasr, Carl Icahn Takes Stake in AIG, Demands 
Company Break Itself Up, CNBC (Oct. 28, 2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/ 
28/carl-icahn-takes-stake-in-aig-demands-company-break-itself-up.html (discussing one of 
Icahn’s recent well-known targets, American International Group) [https://perma.cc/8GRU-
2PXC]. 
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disseminate information to shareholders.47  In 1992, the SEC amended its 
proxy regulations so that large shareholders had the ability to exercise their 
voting rights more effectively.48  This amendment allowed for increased 
communication among shareholders, with fewer disclosure requirements.49  
It “made clear that most shareholders were free to make public statements, 
including speeches, press releases, newspaper advertisements, broadcast 
media, and internet communications.”50  Individual investors, as well as 
institutional investors, could then easily combine their ownership interests 
and exert more influence over a company.51 
Activists began playing an increasingly large role in corporate 
boardrooms in the early 2000s.52  The increase in activism at this time was 
partially in response to the discovery of high-profile corporate fraud at large 
U.S. corporations, such as Enron, Tyco, and Worldcom.53  These scandals 
undermined confidence in both the quality of management and the idea that 
management was not adequately promoting shareholder value.54  While the 
SEC and Congress mainly were concerned with corporations cleaning up 
their accounting, legal, and corporate governance issues, hedge funds 
reminded management not to ignore business strategy and shareholder 
returns.55 
2.  Recent Trends in Hedge Fund Activism 
Shareholder activism has gained “considerable speed” over the past five 
years, with the number of activist interventions increasing by 88 percent 
from 2010 to 2013.56  Activist interventions have increased partly because 
hedge funds are able to raise more capital and thus dramatically increase 
 
 47. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 84. 
 48. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255, 1278–79 (2008). 
 49. See id.; Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 90. 
 50. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 48, at 1277; see also Rose & Sharfman, supra 
note 23, at 1019 (stating that the SEC has shown support for shareholders through rules and 
policies, including those related to communication between shareholders in the context of 
proxy voting). 
 51. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 48, at 1277. 
 52. See Allan Murray, Hedge Funds Are New Sheriffs of Boardroom, WALL STREET J. 
(Dec. 14, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113451884230621753?alg=y 
[http://perma.cc/58UM-MWK6]. 
 53. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 84; see also David Benoit, Activism’s 
Long Road from Corporate Raiding to Banner Year, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 26, 2015, 12:01 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activisms-long-road-from-corporate-raiding-to-banner-
year-1451070910 (discussing shareholders’ reactions toward management after the downfall 
of Enron and WorldCom) [https://perma.cc/4MHB-TMRB]. 
 54. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 84. 
 55. See Murray, supra note 52. 
 56. Peter Galuszka, The Activist Era, NAT. ASSOC. CORP. DIRECTORS DIRECTORSHIP, 
Mar. 29, 2014, at 34.  In 2014 alone, 344 companies worldwide were subject to activist 
demands. See THE VALENCE GRP., ACTIVIST INVESTING:  AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 8 (Josh Black ed., 2015).  The number of demands increased by 18 
percent from 2013. Id. 
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their assets under management.57  As activist funds continue to grow, they 
target larger, iconic corporations that were “previously thought invulnerable 
due to their size.”58  For example, hedge fund activists like Carl Icahn, 
Nelson Peltz, and Bill Ackman are buying ownership in some of America’s 
largest companies, including Proctor & Gamble, Yahoo!, and Apple, and 
then lobbying for strategic change.59 
Moreover, activist campaigns have been increasingly successful.60  In 
2014 alone, activist demands were met 74 percent of the time.61  More 
specifically, when the activists’ goal was to acquire board seats, the 
demands were met 73 percent of the time, allowing activists to gain board 
seats at 107 companies.62  Contributing to this success is not only the 
increase in hedge fund capital, but also an increase in support from 
institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds.63  Since 
large mutual funds are often the biggest stockholders of a corporation, 
gaining their support puts “activist[s] on the path to victory, while losing it 
can spell doom.”64  With support from institutional investors, activists can 
purchase a smaller stake in a company, spend less money, and still win.65 
Opponents of hedge fund activism argue that activists’ growth and 
increased success rate are hurting both corporate boardrooms and 
shareholders.66  They contend that activists consider only short-term effects 
on share price, forcing management to ignore the long-term growth of the 
 
 57. FTI CONSULTING, THE SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS’ VIEW 2 (2015), http:// 
www.fticonsulting.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/reports/shareholder-activism-parti.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4XBN-GXNF].  Through the second quarter of 2015, hedge fund activists 
held over $120 billion in assets. See Giles Turner, The Activist Floodgates Are Open, WALL 
STREET J. (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/08/07/the-activist-
floodgates-are-open-j-p-morgan-says/ [https://perma.cc/SX4H-FV9P]. 
 58. THE VALENCE GRP., supra note 56, at 6. 
 59. David Benoit & Vipal Monga, Are Activist Investors Helping or Undermining 
American Companies?, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/activist-investors-helping-or-hindering-1444067712/ [https://perma.cc/WC3F-
ZY9J]; see also THE VALENCE GRP., supra note 56, at 6 (discussing an increase in activist 
investors’ campaigns against large U.S. companies). 
 60. THE VALENCE GRP., supra note 56, at 6. 
 61. See id. at 9. 
 62. David Benoit & Kirsten Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally:  Big Mutual Funds, 
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 9, 2015, 10:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-
secret-ally-big-mutual-funds-1439173910 [https://perma.cc/VY8R-W2C4].  For 2015, the 
number of activist campaigns increased to 360, and the board seats won in those campaigns 
increased to 127. See Benoit, supra note 53. 
 63. See Rose & Sharfman, supra note 23, at 1019; Benoit & Grind, supra note 62. 
 64. Benoit & Grind, supra note 62.  Note that the plaintiffs in the cases discussed in Part 
II.A and II.C are pension funds. 
 65. Id.  Traditionally, a 5 percent ownership stake was the threshold for shareholder 
activists to be able to influence the target company. MARC ZENNER ET AL., THE ACTIVIST 
REVOLUTION:  UNDERSTANDING & NAVIGATING A NEW WORLD OF HEIGHTENED INVESTOR 
SCRUTINY 6 (2015).  More recently, activists have been successful while owning only less 
than 1 percent of a target company. Id. 
 66. John Carney, Welcome to the Golden Age of Activist Investors, CNBC (Aug. 14, 
2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100963166 [https://perma.cc/2UK6-PU9T]; Steve Denning, 
The Seven Deadly Sins of Activist Hedge Funds, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/02/15/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-activist-
hedge-funds/#b2efb2544477 [https://perma.cc/4BPM-QZZT]. 
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company.67  “Data show a broad array of companies have been plowing 
more cash into dividends and stock buybacks, while spending less on 
investments such as new factories and research and development.”68  These 
commentators further argue that activism “create[s] a massive distraction 
for managers from the real task of management.”69 
Activists, on the other hand, are gaining popularity and, according to 
SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White, losing their “distinctly negative 
connotation.”70  Supporters of activist investing contend that shareholder 
activism represents a necessary check on corporate boardrooms and does 
not promote short-term gains at the expense of long-term performance.71  
Carl Icahn explained that he has, as an activist investor, held many stocks 
for the long term—in some instances for over thirty years.72  He further 
defended activism by explaining that sometimes the wrong people are 
running corporations.73  He has argued that his job is to clean up corporate 
America by removing bad managers and holding CEOs accountable.74  
Additionally, a recent study revealed that, in most cases, research and 
development, profits, and capital investment all improved in response to 
intervention.75 
3.  The Use of Proxy Contests 
Activist investors’ approaches to influencing a corporation “range from 
the relatively benign to extremely hostile.”76  One example of the latter is 
 
 67. Carney, supra note 66; Stephen Foley, Shareholder Activism:  Battle for the 
Boardroom, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/a555abec-be32-11e3-
961f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3uykqgFpD [https://perma.cc/V7RA-9AAF]. 
 68. Vipal Monga, David Benoit & Theo Francis, As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms Spend 
More on Buybacks than Factories, WALL STREET J. (May 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-shareholders-1432693805 [https://perma.cc/ 
C2BV-88XB]. 
 69. Denning, supra note 66. 
 70. Corporate Upgraders, ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21596518-america-should-make-life-easier-not-harder-activist-investors-
corporate-upgraders [https://perma.cc/C68F-MFVS]. 
 71. Benoit & Monga, supra note 59; see also James Saft, In Praise of Activist 
Investment, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2013, 4:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-
activistinvestors-saft-idUSBRE97D17I20130814 (discussing that activists not only create 
short term gains, but also improve the long term performance of companies they target) 
[http://perma.cc/CL77-NGJ7]. 
 72. The New York Times Conferences, DealBook Conference 2015—Activist Investing, 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GsN0WVLjpcs [https:// 
perma.cc/Q7RM-C7A8]. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See An Investor Calls, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
briefing/21642175-sometimes-ill-mannered-speculative-and-wrong-activists-are-rampant-
they-will-change-american [https://perma.cc/544J-A5V5].  A Harvard Law School study 
focused on the performance of firms targeted by activists in the five-year period after activist 
intervention. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1101 (2015).  The study found no 
evidence that activist interventions create short-term gains at the expense of long-term 
performance. See id. at 1117. 
 76. See MARC ZENNER ET AL., supra note 65, at 7. 
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the use of proxy contests as a means of gaining control of the corporate 
board.77  In a proxy contest, an activist shareholder will nominate its own 
slate of directors to the company’s board.78  Nominating a new board will 
allow them to make changes they deem necessary to enhance the value of 
the company.79  Proxy contests also are used in the context of hostile 
takeovers, as corporate raiders often need to elect a new board of directors 
whose interest in a merger or acquisition aligns with their own.80  
Incumbent management often do not want to give up power, however; they 
“tend to have self-interested motives for maintaining control:  they want to 
retain the private benefits (such as high salaries and perks) that are 
associated with exercising control.”81  Thus, shareholders, through the use 
of proxy contests, can facilitate beneficial control changes, even if the 
incumbent management opposes the change.82 
Proxy contests are governed by a combination of federal regulation, state 
law, and corporate charter and bylaw provisions.83  These rules regulate the 
disclosure of fraud in proxy solicitation, revocability of proxies, access by 
shareholders to corporate information, and time and place of shareholder 
meetings.84  Activists have been increasingly successful in winning proxy 
contests.85  As a result of these successes, corporate boards—with the help 
of lending institutions—increasingly are adopting defense provisions which 
inhibit shareholders’ use of proxy contests to compel changes in a 
company’s corporate structure or board of directors.86 
B.  The Proxy Put Defense Mechanism 
Corporate boards use various defense mechanisms both to ward off 
shareholder activists and to reduce the chances of an activist bringing about 
a successful proxy contest.  This section explains the evolution of the proxy 
put, an embedded defense mechanism87 that has conflicting implications.  
On the one hand, proxy puts serve as a device to protect creditors and 
 
 77. Armour & Cheffins, supra note 28, at 257. 
 78. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Boardroom Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES:  
DEALB%K (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/business/dealbook/the-
boardroom-strikes-back.html (describing examples of activist investors using proxy contests 
for board seats as a means of influencing strategic change at a company) [http://perma.cc/ 
42XX-R6NP]. 
 79. Id.  Activists often seek change in the form of issuing a larger dividend, launching a 
share buyback program, or spinning off a business line. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 
48, at 1279. 
 80. See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381, 
383–84 (2002). 
 81. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy 
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1077 (1990). 
 82. See id. at 1077–78. 
 83. See id. at 1082. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See BRENDAN SHEEHAN, TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 579 (2014), http:// 
ggainc.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Shareholder_activism_October_20141.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9MKK-SS87] 
 86. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 87. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
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corporations from activist investors.  On the other hand, they also serve as a 
device to entrench management, impede shareholder rights, and limit a 
board’s ability to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.  Part 
I.B.1 addresses poison puts, the antecedent to proxy puts.  Part I.B.2 
discusses proxy puts, a specific type of poison put.  Finally, Part I.B.3 
discusses dead hand proxy puts, which add more restrictive language to the 
traditional proxy puts. 
1.  Poison Puts 
Poison puts—also known as event-risk covenants or change in control 
covenants—are contractual provisions commonly found in debt 
instruments.88  They provide that, on the occurrence of a triggering event,89 
some consequential remedy will become available to the debtholders.90  In 
many cases, poison puts are triggered by a change in control.91  Upon such 
change, the debtholder has the right, but not the obligation, to require a 
corporation to pay back the outstanding loan.92  Poison put provisions have 
been coined “unregulable takeover defenses” because they are not governed 
by shareholder vote.93  Instead, they are subject to the full discretion of the 
contracting parties.94 
Poison puts frequently are found in documents governing large bond 
issuances, however, they are not limited in this respect.95  Because these 
provisions are written into contracts, they are considered “embedded 
defenses.”96  An embedded defense is an action taken by managers for 
supposed legitimate, nondefensive business reasons, but that also deters 
tender offers, hostile acquisitions, and activist interventions.97  Managers 
often employ embedded defenses, such as change in control provisions in 
 
 88. See FREDERICK L. BERESKIN & HELEN BOWERS, POISON PUTS:  CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OR MECHANISM FOR SHIFTING RISK? 1 (2015), http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Poison-Puts-Research-Sept-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
T2T6-4NGA]. 
 89. A triggering event could be a change in control of the board of directors, a 
downgrade in bond rating, or the acquisition of a certain percentage of a corporation’s 
shares. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds:  
Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931, 936–37 
(1993). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 1. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2 (quoting Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils 
of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 597 (2003)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 1.  Poison puts may also be found in licensing 
agreements, employment contracts, credit revolvers, and lease agreements. Id. 
 96. Arlen & Talley, supra note 93, at 597; see also Guhan Subramanian, The Emerging 
Problem of Embedded Defenses:  Lessons From Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l. v. UAL Corp., 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1242–43 (2007) (discussing embedded defenses as an antitakeover 
defense mechanism). 
 97. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 3–4; Arlen & Talley, supra note 93, at 597. 
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debt agreements, to insulate their own positions on the board rather than 
serve legitimate business purposes.98 
Debtholders created poison puts during the 1980s to hedge against the 
risk associated with restructurings, takeovers, and leveraged buyouts.99  
Bondholders also were interested in using these provisions to limit the risk 
associated with a decline in bond ratings, or deterioration in a company’s 
financial performance.100  If a rating agency downgraded a corporation’s 
bonds after a takeover, bonds that were previously investment grade could 
turn into “speculative grade junk,” forcing bondholders to realize an 
enormous loss.101 
The RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout is considered the pivotal transaction 
in regard to promoting the use of poison puts in debt agreements.102  
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), a large private equity firm, 
announced that it was considering a leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco.103  
As a result, the price of RJR Nabisco’s bonds dropped by 20 percent, 
leaving bondholders facing losses of $1 billion.104  The acquisition also put 
RJR into greater debt and thus increased the chances of default.105 
In the aftermath of the RJR Nabisco buyout, corporate bond investors 
began to demand increased protection.106  They became both more aware 
of, and concerned with, event risk—the risk that bond prices will decline as 
a result of a change in the capital structure of a firm.107  In an effort to 
minimize this risk, banks began to negotiate poison puts into their 
agreements to prevent investment schemes that would change the capital 
structure of the firm.108  Independent of the benefit to bondholders, these 
provisions were effective in insulating managers against both control 
change and proxy contests.109 
 
 98. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 4 (discussing the use of embedded defenses as a 
management entrenchment device). 
 99. Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Defense Against Hostile Takeovers Develops a 
Downside, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K (Nov. 25, 2014, 1:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/11/25/a-defense-against-hostile-takeovers-develops-a-downside/ 
[https://perma.cc/U8JM-SEV4]; see also Leland Crabbe, Event Risk:  An Analysis of Losses 
to Bondholders and “Super Poison Put” Bond Covenants, 46 J. FIN. 689, 689 (1991). 
 100. See Crabbe, supra note 99, at 696–97. 
 101. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 933.  Between 1984 and 1988, rating agencies 
downgraded $30.79 billion in investment grade bonds to speculative grade.  These bonds 
were associated with capital restructurings. See Crabbe, supra note 99, at 689 n.1. 
 102. See Solomon, supra note 99; see also John C. Coffee Jr., Unstable Coalitions:  
Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1519–21 (1990) 
(discussing the RJR Nabisco buyout). 
 103. See Solomon, supra note 99. 
 104. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 932. 
 105. See Solomon, supra note 99. 
 106. See Crabbe, supra note 99, at 696–97. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 946. 
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2.  Proxy Puts 
A proxy put is a specific type of poison put designed to mitigate 
management’s risk against actual or threatened proxy contests.110  While 
poison puts are triggered by a number of different events, proxy puts are 
specifically triggered by shareholders’ use of a proxy contest to replace a 
majority of the board of directors.111  Proxy puts also are considered 
“Hostile Control Change Covenants,” defined as covenants that protect 
against a proxy challenge replacing a majority of a firm’s directors.112  
“The triggering events included in Hostile Control Change Covenants 
reflect an intent to protect management, however, not bondholders.”113  
Commentators argue that these provisions, like traditional poison puts, can 
serve to entrench incumbent board members to the detriment of 
shareholders who wish to exercise their right to elect a new board through a 
proxy contest.114 
A proxy put is thus a change in control covenant, often in a loan 
agreement, which typically gives the lender the right to demand redemption 
of any or all of the outstanding debt on the occurrence of a fundamental 
change, or a change in control.115  A change in control generally is defined 
as an event by which 
a majority of the members of the board of directors or other equivalent 
governing body of the Company cease to be composed of individuals (i)  
who were members of that board or equivalent governing body on the 
first day of such period, (ii)  whose election or nomination to that board or 
equivalent governing body was approved by individuals referred to in 
clause (i) above constituting at the time of such election or nomination at 
least a majority of that board or equivalent governing body or (iii)  whose 
election or nomination to that board or other equivalent governing body 
was approved by individuals referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) above 
constituting at the time of such election or nomination at least a majority 
of that board or equivalent governing body.116 
These provisions make it more difficult for activist shareholders to change a 
majority of the board, namely because any new director will be considered 
noncontinuing,117 and if a majority becomes noncontinuing, there is a 
change in control and the proxy put is triggered.118  Traditional proxy puts 
allow the incumbent board to approve new directors, effectively rendering 
 
 110. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 2–3. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 952–54; WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 3–4. 
 113. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 953. 
 114. See id.; Solomon, supra note 99. 
 115. See BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 1. 
 116. Davey & Kelly, supra note 13 (quoting San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. 
Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 309 (Del. Ch. 2009)). 
 117. Continuing directors are those directors who were either in office at the origination 
of the debt agreement, or, in the case of traditional proxy puts, approved by a majority of the 
incumbent directors that were in office at the time of the agreement. See id. 
 118. See id.  The change in control often constitutes an event of default in these debt 
agreements. See id. 
2016] OUTLAWING DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS 2961 
them continuing directors.  They still, however, deter investors from waging 
proxy contests out of a fear that the incumbent directors will not approve 
the new slate.119 
Proxy puts serve as a tool for management to ward off shareholder 
activists’ momentum for change.120  Activist investors often lobby for 
board seats, thus implicating the proxy put.121  In response to the significant 
growth among these activists, more debt agreements are emerging with 
proxy put provisions.122  Plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that the threat of a firm 
having to refinance its debt as a result of a proxy put being triggered 
discourages would-be activist investors from engaging with the 
company.123 
The Delaware Chancery Court recently addressed proxy puts, specifically 
in situations where a shareholder activist buys a significant portion of an 
underperforming company’s shares and then launches a proxy contest to 
alter the majority of a board of directors.124  The court appeared skeptical of 
proxy puts because of their entrenchment effects, though it has not 
outlawed their use entirely.125  In two recent Delaware cases, analyzed in 
Part II.A and II.B, the companies’ loan agreements included proxy put 
provisions, which allowed the creditor to require repayment of the 
companies’ outstanding debt if a majority of the boards became 
noncontinuing.126  The proxy put provisions in these Delaware cases 
allowed the shareholders to elect the new board—through a proxy contest 
or otherwise—as long as the incumbent board approved the dissident 
directors.127  This is a feature of the traditional proxy put that has been 
eliminated in some credit agreements, the result of which creates a dead 
hand feature.128 
 
 119. Liz Hoffman, Banks Feel the Heat from Lawsuits, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 28, 2015, 
6:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-feel-the-heat-from-lawsuits-1430259260? 
alg=y [https://perma.cc/HF5L-264U]. 
 120. See Solomon, supra note 99; supra Part I.A.2. 
 121. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 5–7 (discussing the Amylin case, where activist 
investors Icahn and Eastbourne nominated a slate of directors who, if elected, would trigger 
the proxy put). 
 122. See Hoffman, supra note 119. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See generally Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013); San 
Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009); 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15. 
 125. See Amylin, 983 A.2d at 315; see also Kallick, 68 A.3d at 248 (stating that, given the 
proxy put’s blatant entrenchment function, one would hope that the company not only put up 
a hard bargain, but also receive a clear economic advantage in exchange for the provisions). 
 126. See infra Part II.A–B.  If a majority of the board became noncontinuing, and the 
lender chose to accelerate the debt under the agreement, the company would face disastrous 
financial results as it attempted to refinance. See Camisha L. Simmons, Lenders & Directors 
Beware of the Dead-Hand Proxy Put, AM. BANKR. INST. J., http://nebula.wsimg.com/ 
ac72391defcee29e597411f804d4c272?AccessKeyId=3B39241A60E84B884186&dispositio
n=0&alloworigin=1 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6UFB-9H8V]. 
 127. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 128. See Simmons, supra note 126. 
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3.  Dead Hand Proxy Puts 
Both commentators and the Delaware Chancery Court have criticized a 
particular type of proxy put:  the dead hand proxy put.129  This is because 
these provisions prevent the incumbent board from neutralizing the put 
even if they approve the dissident slate of directors.130  In other words, 
regardless of the incumbent board’s approval of new directors, the new slate 
will still be considered “noncontinuing”; thus the debtholder will have the 
right to require the borrower to repurchase the debt.131  The language in 
these provisions makes it nearly impossible for shareholders to change the 
board of directors without triggering the proxy put.132 
Dead hand proxy puts and traditional proxy puts generally define a 
change in control the same way.133  However, the following parenthetical is 
added to the traditional language: 
[E]xcluding, in the case of both clause (ii) and clause (iii), any individual 
whose initial nomination for, or assumption of office as, a member of that 
board or equivalent governing body occurs as a result of an actual or 
threatened solicitation of proxies or consents for the election or removal 
of one or more directors by any person or group other than a solicitation 
for the election of one or more directors by or on behalf of the board of 
directors.134 
These provisions exclude from the definition of “continuing director” those 
whose nomination or assumption of office resulted from a proxy contest.135  
This type of dead hand proxy put thus hinders the shareholders from 
removing current board members and nominating a new slate of directors 
through a proxy contest.136 
As with traditional proxy puts, dead hand proxy puts also have become 
more important to corporations and creditors in light of the current wave of 
shareholder activism.137  Plaintiffs’ attorneys and other opponents of these 
provisions argue that they serve as an entrenchment mechanism for 
management and a restraint on the stockholder franchise.138  Nevertheless, 
proponents of the dead hand feature argue that they are necessary for the 
 
 129. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15. See also infra Part II. 
 130. Simmons, supra note 126. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See F. William Reindel et al., Dead Hand Proxy Puts:  What You Need to Know, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 10, 2015), http:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/10/dead-hand-proxy-puts-what-you-need-to-know/ 
[https://perma.cc/99JA-FYFR]. 
 133. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 134. Davey & Kelly, supra note 13 (quoting San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. 
Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 309 (Del. Ch. 2009)). 
 135. See Simmons, supra note 126. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Hoffman, supra note 119. 
 138. See generally Verified Class Action Complaint, Stein v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 
11352 (Del. Ch. Jul 30, 2015); WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 3. 
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proxy put to be effective.139  Further, they contend that the dead hand proxy 
put serves a legitimate business interest, namely protecting creditors.140 
C.  The Poison Pill Defense Mechanism 
In addition to the use of proxy puts, boards also adopt poison pill 
provisions as a means to defend against unwanted change and hostile 
takeovers.  These provisions, like proxy puts, have developed over time to 
include a dead hand feature.  Dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy 
puts have strikingly similar effects on both corporate boards and 
shareholders.141  Part I.C.1 provides a background on poison pills—which 
are currently legal in Delaware—while Part I.C.2 discusses dead hand and 
no hand poison pills, which the Delaware courts have outlawed. 
1.  Poison Pills 
During the 1980s, corporations developed defenses specifically designed 
to ward off hostile takeovers.142  Poison pills are shareholder rights plans143 
intended to make hostile takeovers difficult for the acquirer, “either by 
making the acquisition poisonously expensive or by placing a bidder in a 
lesser position vis-à-vis the other shareholders.”144  While in place, the 
poison pill is an insurmountable barrier to a hostile takeover.145  Poison 
pills can be implemented easily without a shareholder vote, and “[t]he only 
way to counter a poison pill is to have it removed.”146 
A board usually will adopt poison pills in an amendment to the 
company’s bylaws.147  The terms of the poison pill generally authorize the 
creation of new securities and “[r]ights to purchase those securities.”148  
Both of these poison pills serve to dilute the value of the investment; 
therefore, “acquirers are careful to avoid ‘swallowing’ the poison pill.”149 
 
 139. See Reindel et al., supra note 132; see also Kevin Miller, Food for Thought:  
Conflicting Views on the “Knowing Participation” Element of Aiding & Abetting Claims, 9 
DEAL LAW. 1, 1 (2015) (discussing the need for proxy puts to protect creditors). 
 140. See Hoffman, supra note 119; see also Part II.D.2 (discussing arguments in favor of 
the use of dead hand proxy puts to protect creditors). 
 141. See infra Part III. 
 142. PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 
153–54 (4th ed. 2007). 
 143. Poison pills are referred to as shareholder rights plans because the purpose of the 
poison pill device is to distribute rights to shareholders, entitling them to purchase stock or 
other securities upon a triggering event. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDES:  CORPORATION LAW § 23:7 (2012). 
 144. The Targets Strategy in a Multistep Acquisition, in CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 
MERGERS, AND DIVESTITURES § 10:46 (2015). 
 145. See Velasco, supra note 80, at 382. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Charles M. Yablon, Poison Pills & Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE L.J. 54, 58. 
 148. Id.  At the time the board adopts the shareholder rights plan, the rights lack 
economic value and are not exercisable until the occurrence of a specified triggering event, 
such as a merger or takeover. See Suzanne S. Dawson, Robert J. Pence & David S. Stone, 
Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 423–24 (1987). 
 149. Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills & Partisans:  Understanding 
Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 642–43 (2012). 
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Generally, poison pills contain a provision that allows for the board of 
directors to redeem the pill.150  If the board redeems the pill, the acquirer is 
able to go through with the takeover without triggering the pill’s negative 
consequences.151  If, however, the board will not redeem the pill, the 
acquirer likely will attempt to replace a majority of the board through a 
proxy contest.152  If successful, the new board will redeem the pill, and the 
acquisition will occur without the dilutive effects of the poison pill being 
triggered.153 
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of the poison pill in 
Moran v. Household International, Inc.154  Fearing a leveraged buyout, 
Household International, Inc. amended its bylaws to include a shareholder 
rights plan “as a preventive mechanism to ward off future advances.”155  
The Moran court concluded that DGCL section 157 provides sufficient 
authority for the board to adopt the rights plan.156  Specifically, section 157 
provides the power to issue rights to purchase shares of capital stock.157  
Moreover, the court found that the rights plan did not limit the voting power 
of individual shareholders and had only a minimal effect on proxy 
contests.158 
2.  Dead Hand Poison Pills and No Hand Poison Pills 
As discussed above, a potential acquirer can wage a proxy contest to 
elect a new board that is willing to redeem a poison pill, thus avoiding the 
pill’s negative effects.159  To prevent such an election, boards gradually 
altered poison pill provisions to create “dead hand” and “no hand” poison 
pills.160  A dead hand provision requires that the poison pill be redeemed 
only by “continuing directors,” defined as directors who were in place at the 
 
 150. See Dawson et al., supra note 148, at 427. 
 151. Barry & Hatfield, supra note 149, at 644. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).  Household International was a diversified holding 
company with subsidiaries in the financial services, transportation, and merchandising 
industries. See id. at 1349. 
 155. Id.  The rights plan provided that Household common stockholders were entitled to 
the issuance of one right per common share if certain triggering events occurred. See id. at 
1348.  There were two triggering events written into the plan:  the announcement of a tender 
offer for 30 percent of Household’s shares and the acquisition of 20 percent of Household’s 
shares. See id. 
 156. Id. at 1353.  In addition to finding authority under section 157, the court also found 
that the board had inherent authority, under DGCL section 141(a), to manage the 
corporations business and affairs. Id. 
 157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a) (2011). 
 158. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.  The court explained that, despite the poison pill, 
shareholders could still make a tender offer and bring a proxy contest.  They might do this by 
making the tender offer conditional on the rights being redeemed, or by forming a group to 
purchase only 19.9 percent of the shares and solicit proxies for consent to remove the board 
and redeem the rights. Id. at 1354. 
 159. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 160. Peter V. Letsou, Are Dead Hand (and No Hand) Poison Pills Really Dead?, 68 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1112–14 (2000); COX & HAZEN, supra note 143, § 23:7. 
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time the pill was adopted, or are supported by those directors.161  A no hand 
provision limits the board’s ability to redeem the pill once a majority of the 
board has been replaced.162  These provisions provide that even successful 
proxy contests, which replace an incumbent board with a new slate of 
directors, will not prevent the pill from being triggered.163 
The dead hand poison pill makes it even more difficult—indeed nearly 
impossible—to use a proxy contest to gain control of the corporation’s 
board for the purpose of redeeming the pill.164  In a takeover scenario, an 
acquirer often tenders an offer to buy the outstanding shares of the target 
and initiates a proxy contest to nominate a slate of directors who will 
redeem the pill.165  With dead hand poison pills, electing a new slate of 
directors will automatically trigger the poison pill because only continuing 
directors may redeem the rights plan.166  Thus, where there is a dead hand 
poison pill, shareholders are less likely to initiate proxy contests to elect 
new board members. 
In Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc.,167 the Delaware Chancery Court 
considered whether dead hand poison pills were subject to legal challenge 
on the basis that they violated the DGCL and the fiduciary duties of the 
board of directors.168  The court ultimately denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, finding that the dead hand rights plan was subject to legal 
challenge on both statutory and fiduciary duty grounds.169 
The Toll Brothers rights plan was adopted as a preemptive defensive 
mechanism, in that it was not in response to any specific threat.170  What 
distinguished the Toll Brothers rights plan from traditional poison pills was 
a dead hand feature, which provided that “it authorizes only a specific, 
defined category of directors—the ‘Continuing Directors’—to redeem the 
Rights.”171 
The court first concluded that the statutory claims were legally 
cognizable on the grounds that they may have the effect of limiting the 
board’s power conferred by DGCL section 141(a), which authorizes the 
board to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.172  The court 
referred to a New York Supreme Court case,173 which invalidated a similar 
continuing director provision, on the basis that it “effectively limits the 
 
 161. Letsou, supra note 160, at 1103; Velasco, supra note 80, at 383–84. 
 162. See Letsou, supra note 160, at 1103. 
 163. See id. at 1114. 
 164. Id. at 1101–02. 
 165. See id. at 1101. 
 166. See id. 
 167. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 168. See id. at 1182. 
 169. See id. at 1184–85.  The motion did not focus on whether the rights plan was invalid, 
but rather on whether the complaint stated a legally cognizable claim for invalidity. Id. 
 170. See id. at 1183. 
 171. Id. at 1184. 
 172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).  The statute states that “[t]he business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors.” Id. 
 173. Bank of N.Y. Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988). 
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powers of the future board.”174  Specifically, even if the stockholders 
properly elect a new board but the incumbent board does not approve the 
directors, the future board may not redeem the shares.175 
The Chancery Court considered whether the plaintiffs had a valid claim 
for breach of the duty of loyalty176 based on (1)  the disenfranchisement of 
shareholders’ rights and (2)  the reasonableness of the adopted dead hand 
defense mechanism.177  The complaint alleged that the dead hand provision 
“purposefully disenfranchises the company’s shareholders without any 
compelling justification” because the shareholders would be powerless to 
elect a new board that would be willing and able to redeem the poison pill 
and accept the bid.178  The court determined, while avoiding the merits, that 
the complaint stated legally cognizable claims, in turn making it clear that 
the adoption of the defensive mechanism could be coercive under Delaware 
law and may represent a breach of statutory and fiduciary duties of the Toll 
Brothers board.179 
The Delaware Supreme Court in Quickturn Design Systems v. Shapiro180 
explicitly reinforced the Toll Bros. ruling.  Indeed, it went one step further 
and openly invalidated the use of dead hand and no hand poison pill 
provisions.181  In Quickturn, Mentor Graphics Corp., the hostile bidder, 
wanted to acquire Quickturn, a publically traded company whose business 
competed with Mentor’s.182  Mentor announced a tender offer for all 
outstanding common shares of Quickturn and also announced that it 
intended to solicit proxies to replace Quickturn’s board.183 
Shortly after Mentor’s announcement, Quickturn amended its rights plan 
to include a no hand, or delayed redemption, provision.184  “The [d]elayed 
[r]edemption [p]rovision provide[d] that, if a majority of the directors are 
replaced by stockholder action, the newly elected board cannot redeem the 
rights for six months if the purpose or effect of the redemption would be to 
facilitate a transaction with an [i]nterested [p]erson.”185 
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the delayed redemption 
plan was invalid because, similar to the dead hand poison pill, it deprived a 
newly elected slate of directors from fulfilling its statutory duty to manage 
 
 174. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1191 (quoting Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d at 484). 
 175. See id. 
 176. The duty of loyalty requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation 
and shareholders and demands that any director not only protect the corporations’ interests, 
but also refrain from harming the corporation or its shareholders.  Satisfying the duty of 
loyalty requires a director to put the interests of the corporation and stockholders before his 
or her private interests. See Randy J. Holland, Distinguished Jurist Lecture, Delaware 
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties:  The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 683 (2009). 
 177. See Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1189–90. 
 178. Id. at 1193. 
 179. Id. at 1182. 
 180. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
 181. Id. at 1292. 
 182. See id. at 1283. 
 183. See id. at 1285. 
 184. See id. at 1289. 
 185. Id.  An interested person is defined as “a party that ‘directly or indirectly proposed, 
nominated or financially supported’ the election of the new board.” Id. at 1290. 
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the corporation under section 141(a), in addition to its fiduciary duties to 
shareholders.186  Specifically, the court focused on section 141(a), finding 
the delayed redemption provision invalid because it prevented the newly 
elected board from having full discretion “to manage and direct the business 
and affairs of a Delaware corporation.”187 
Moreover, the delayed redemption plan limited the directors’ decisions 
regarding management and prevented the new board from redeeming the 
rights plan “to facilitate a transaction that would serve the stockholders best 
interests, even under circumstances where the board would be required to 
do so because of its fiduciary duty to the Quickturn stockholders.”188  As a 
result, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated the use of no hand delayed 
redemption provisions, stating that no defensive measure that inhibits a 
board from discharging its fiduciary duties can be sustained.189 
II.  DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS POPPING UP IN DELAWARE 
Part II addresses the current litigation in the Delaware courts surrounding 
the use of both proxy puts and dead hand proxy puts.  Part II.A and II.B 
provide an analysis of two recent cases involving traditional proxy puts.  
Part II.C then discusses the most recent case, which involves the use of a 
dead hand proxy put.  Finally, Part II.D provides a discussion of the debate 
regarding the legitimacy of these provisions, considering their effects on 
stockholders, creditors, and management. 
A.  Reluctant Acceptance in San Antonio Fire & Police 
Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
In San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., Amylin Pharmaceuticals faced a proxy contest initiated by two 
investors seeking to replace a majority of the board of directors.190  The 
change in the majority of the board, without the current board’s approval, 
would trigger financially harmful provisions in Amylin’s indenture and 
credit agreement.191  The issue in this case was “whether a commonplace 
provision found in a trust indenture governing publically traded notes 
prevents the issuer’s board of directors from ‘approving’ as ‘continuing 
directors’ persons nominated by stockholders in opposition to the slate 
nominated by the incumbent directors.”192 
 
 186. See id. at 1291–92. 
 187. Id. at 1292. 
 188. Id. at 1292–93. 
 189. Id. at 1293. 
 190. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 
307 (Del. Ch. 2009); supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 191. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 306–07. 
 192. Id. at 306. 
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1.  The Proxy Put Provisions 
The suit in Amylin arose out of a change in control provision in a 2007 
note indenture adopted by the board.193  This indenture provided that 
noteholders have the right to redeem any or all of their notes at face value 
upon the occurrence of a “[f]undamental [c]hange.”194  It further defined a 
fundamental change as occurring if “at any time the [c]ontinuing [d]irectors 
do not constitute a majority of the [c]ompany’s [b]oard of [d]irectors.”195  
At the time of the suit, the board was composed of twelve continuing 
directors.196  The indenture agreement did allow for new directors to 
become continuing if approved by the incumbent board and did not 
explicitly contain dead hand language.  However, the indenture trustee 
argued for a reading with that effect.197 
Amylin’s credit agreement also contained a continuing director’s 
provision.198  In this agreement, a change in control199 triggered an event of 
default, which accelerated the debt unless the provision was waived.200  The 
change in control provision allowed for a change in the board’s composition 
if the incumbent board approved them, unless the new nomination resulted 
from an actual or threatened proxy contest.201  If both provisions were 
triggered—those in the indenture and credit agreement—Amylin would be 
forced to repay up to $915 million immediately.202 
2.  The Proxy Contest 
The change in control provisions in the indenture and credit agreement 
came to the attention of the shareholders in 2009, when Icahn Partners LP, 
owner of 8.8 percent of outstanding Amylin shares, notified the company 
that it would be nominating a slate of five directors.203  At the same time, 
Eastbourne Capital, owner of 12.5 percent of Amylin’s shares, notified the 
 
 193. Id. at 307; see also Icahn, Amylin and the New Nuances of Activist Investing, supra 
note 6 (explaining the facts giving rise to the lawsuit against Amylin). 
 194. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 307–08. 
 195. Id.  Section 1.01 of the indenture defined continuing directors as: 
(i)  individuals who on the [i]ssue [d]ate constituted the [b]oard of [d]irectors and 
(ii)  any new directors whose election to the [b]oard of [d]irectors or whose 
nomination for election by the stockholders of the [c]ompany was approved by at 
least a majority of the directors then still in office (or a duly constituted committee 
thereof) either who were directors on the [i]ssue [d]ate or whose election or 
nomination for election was previously so approved. 
Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 314–15. 
 198. See id. at 308–09. 
 199. See supra notes 116, 134 and accompanying text for the exact wording in the credit 
agreement. 
 200. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 308. 
 201. See id.  While not defined as such in the Amylin case, by the nature of its terms, this 
provision was a dead hand proxy put. 
 202. Id. at 310 n.7. 
 203. Id. at 309.  This nomination alone would not trigger the provisions because a change 
of five directors would still leave the majority of the board continuing. Id. 
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company of its intent to nominate another five directors.204  If ten new 
directors were elected to the board, the provisions in both agreements 
would be triggered, and the lenders would have the right to recall the 
debt.205  Eastbourne questioned the legitimacy of the provisions and 
requested that the board “remove any obstacle to the operation of the 
stockholder franchise, including ‘approving’ the dissident slates for 
purposes of the 2007 [n]otes and obtaining any necessary consents or 
waivers from the lenders under the [c]redit [a]greement.”206 
3.  The Chancery Court Decision 
The San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund (SAFPPF), an owner of 
shares in Amylin, filed a class action suit against the company and its 
individual directors.207  The claims against Amylin included:  (1)  breaches 
of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by adopting the credit agreement 
and indentures, (2)  breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by 
failing to approve the nominated slate of directors, and (3)  breaches of the 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in disclosing the risks presented by the 
continuing directors provisions in Amylin’s annual report.208  SAFPPF had 
also brought suit against Bank of America, the underwriter of the credit 
agreement, for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duties.209  The 
court recognized the restrictive nature of the language in the credit 
agreement, which specifically excluded approval for directors appointed 
through a proxy contest.210  However, because the claims were settled out 
of court through an agreement between Amylin and Bank of America, the 
court did not provide a remedy for the credit agreement’s dead hand 
provisions.211 
The Chancery Court then addressed whether the Amylin board had both 
the power and right, under the indenture, to approve the dissident slate of 
directors.212  The Chancery Court ultimately concluded that, regardless of 
whether the Amylin board endorsed or recommended the dissident slate of 
directors, the board retained the power to approve them.213  Thus, it held 
that the board may approve the nominated directors, while simultaneously 
supporting and endorsing their own slate.214  The court proclaimed that the 
board has the right to approve the stockholder nominees if the board 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. at 309–10. 
 206. Id. at 310.  
 207. Id. 
 208. Id.  The parties decided to settle some of the claims outside of court.  As part of 
these settlement negotiations, Eastbourne and Icahn agreed to reduce the number of 
nominated directors.  As a result, no more than five stockholder-nominated directors would 
have been elected.  With less than a majority of the board changing, the continuing director 
provisions would not be triggered. Id. 
 209. Id. at 311. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Davey & Kelly, supra note 13. 
 212. Amylin, 938 A.2d at 312. 
 213. Id. at 314. 
 214. Id. 
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determines, in good faith, that the newly approved directors would not 
materially harm the company.215 
Thus, the court rejected the indenture trustee’s interpretation, which 
would have denied the incumbent board the flexibility of approving the 
slate of new directors without endorsing them.  This interpretation of the 
provision would have effectively written in dead hand language that would 
prohibit any change in the majority of the board as a result of any contested 
elections for the life of the indenture agreement.  The court recognized that 
preventing any election of stockholder nominees resulting from a proxy 
contest might serve as a prohibited entrenchment mechanism for the 
incumbent board.216 
The Chancery Court expressed skepticism toward indentures that do not 
allow the current board to both approve the new directors and stop the 
proxy put from being triggered.217  It stated, “Provision[s] so strongly in 
derogation of the stockholders’ franchise rights would likely put the trustee 
and noteholders on constructive notice of the possibility of its ultimate 
unenforceability.”218  The court also noted that if such a constricting 
provision did exist, the board would need to prove that, in exchange, it was 
obtaining extraordinary economic value for the corporation that was 
otherwise unavailable.219  The Amylin court suggested that provisions with 
such “eviscerating effect[s] on the stockholder franchise” might raise 
serious concerns regarding the board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties, as 
well as the degree to which the provision might be unenforceable as against 
public policy.220 
Thus, the Chancery Court did not outlaw proxy puts or continuing 
director provisions in Amylin.  However, the court was highly skeptical of 
those provisions that would leave the board without the ability to prevent 
the triggering of a proxy put.221  The court interpreted the indenture to 
avoid such a restrictive view of the board’s ability to approve a new slate of 
directors.222  Moreover, the court put borrowers and lenders on notice that 
provisions with restrictive dead hand features may, ultimately, be 
unenforceable.223 
B.  Requiring Substantial Risk:  
Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc. 
Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc.224 also involved a proxy contest to 
change the makeup of the board of directors of Sandridge Energy.225  TPG-
 
 215. Id. at 313.  At this stage in the suit, the Amylin board had already agreed to approve 
the dissident slate of directors, as long as the court allowed it to do so. Id. 
 216. Id. at 314–15. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 315 n.32. 
 219. Id. at 315. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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Axon, a hedge fund holding 7 percent of Sandridge shares, wished to de-
stagger the Sandridge board.226  Gerald Kallick, another Sandridge 
shareholder, supported the TPG-Axon proxy solicitation and brought claims 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty against the Sandridge board.227  The issue 
in this case, again, arose out of a proxy put that would be triggered if a 
majority of Sandridge’s board changed.228  If the shareholders chose to 
elect a new slate of directors, the proxy put would cause $4.3 billion worth 
of Sandridge notes to become due.229  At the time of the litigation, the 
incumbent board had left the slate of directors nominated by TPG-Axon 
unapproved and took the position that even if the debt came due, 
Sandridge’s financial position would not be jeopardized.230 
1.  The Proxy Put Provision 
The Sandridge note indentures included a change of control provision, 
which, when triggered, would require Sandridge to offer to repurchase its 
existing debt.231  This provision, although entrenching on the board if they 
refused to approve the new slate of directors, did not contain a dead hand 
feature.  As a result, the incumbent board had the ability to “neutralize the 
effect of the [p]roxy [p]ut by ‘approving’ the TPG-Axon slate of directors, 
in accordance with the terms of the indentures.”232 
 
 225. Id. at 244. 
 226. Id.  The staggered board was implemented via the company’s bylaws.  Therefore, it 
could be changed by stockholder vote. Id.  A staggered board “is a governance practice in 
which only a fraction (typically a third) of the members of the board of directors is elected 
each year, rather than all at once.” Definition of Staggered Board, FIN. TIMES, http:// 
lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=staggered-board (last visited Apr. 29, 2015) [https://perma.cc/ 
M4EE-VQNX].  Staggered boards are known as a takeover defense mechanism because they 
increase the amount of time a hostile bidder has to wait to replace a majority of the board. 
See id. 
 227. Kallick, 68 A.3d at 245. 
 228. Id. at 244. 
 229. Id. at 245. 
 230. Id.  Originally, the incumbent board warned shareholders that triggering the proxy 
put was risky. See id.  However, the board then claimed that, because the notes were trading 
above the repurchase price set in the indenture, debtholders were not likely to require 
payment at a below-market price. See id. 
 231. Id. at 244.  The notes state that a change in control occurs 
if, during any period of two consecutive years, individuals who at the beginning of 
such period constituted the [b]oard of [d]irectors of the [c]ompany or any 
[s]uccessor [p]arent (together with any new directors whose election to such board 
or whose nomination for election by the stockholders of the [c]ompany or any 
[s]uccessor [p]arent, as the case may be, was approved by a vote of 66 2/3% of the 
directors then still in office who were either directors at the beginning of such 
period or whose election or nomination for election was previously so approved), 
cease for any reason to constitute a majority of such [b]oard of [d]irectors then in 
office. 
Id. at 250 (emphasis omitted). 
 232. Id. 
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2.  The Proxy Contest 
The proxy put came to the attention of stockholders after TPG-Axon filed 
its preliminary consent solicitation statement.233  TPG-Axon initiated the 
solicitation after a disappointing performance following the company’s 
initial public offering.234  TPG-Axon demanded that the board be 
declassified and that it investigate alternative strategies intended to 
maximize shareholder value.235  The Sandridge board warned the 
stockholders that under the terms of its senior notes, any change in control 
would require the company to pay back its outstanding debt.236 
3.  The Chancery Court Decision 
Kallick, favoring the change requested by TPG-Axon, brought suit and 
argued that the board breached its fiduciary duties in refusing to approve the 
slate nominated by TPG.237  The Chancery Court applied the intermediate 
standard of review expressed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.238  
This standard in effect removes director self-interest from the equation, 
because the board is required to justify their actions as reasonable.239  The 
incumbent board argued that the business judgment rule should apply to its 
decision not to approve the board of directors.240  The court, however, 
found that in “situations where board[s] of directors make decisions that 
 
 233. Id.  A consent solicitation is a statement mailed to shareholders, in lieu of an annual 
meeting, asking them to vote for a specific change to the company. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 211(b) (2011).  TPG-Axon’s consent solicitation, in this case, requested that shareholders 
send back the consent card in favor of its proposal to amend the company’s bylaws and 
replace the entire board with a new slate of qualified directors. See Martinne Geller, 
UPDATE 2-TPG-Axon Moves Ahead with Plan to Oust SandRidge Board, CHI. TRIB.:  
REUTERS (Dec. 24, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-24/news/sns-rt-tpg-
axon-sandridgeboard-update-2l1e8no4hg-20121224_1_sandridge-energy-tpg-axon-
sandridge-shares [https://perma.cc/84YW-VADU]. 
 234. Kallick, 68 A.3d at 249. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 250. 
 237. Id. at 245. 
 238. 493 A.2d 946 (1985).  In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, in the 
context of takeovers, the business judgment rule does not apply to a board’s decision 
“[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interest, rather than those of the corporation.” Id. at 954.  Instead, the court should apply a 
heightened standard, which involves a two-part test.  First, the directors must show that they 
had reasonable grounds for believing that a threat to the corporation existed. Id.  Next, the 
board must show that the defensive measure adopted was reasonable in relation to the threat 
posed. Id. at 955. 
 239. Kallick, 68 A.3d at 259.  Kallick argued for the Blasius standard of review, which 
requires greater scrutiny than Unocal. See id. at 258.  The court rejected this argument 
because the board’s refusal to accept the new slate of directors was not “taken for the sole or 
primary purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote.” Id. (citing Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas 
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988)).  The Blasius standard of review requires the 
board to demonstrate a compelling justification for its actions. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661; 
Stephen Byeff, Note, The Spirit of Blasius:  Sandridge As an Antidote to the Poison Put, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 409–15 (2015) (arguing that the Chancery Court should have applied 
the Blasius standard of review). 
 240. Kallick, 68 A.3d at 257. 
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have clear implications for their continued control,” Unocal applies as an 
“equitable tool[] to protect stockholders against unreasonable director 
action that has a defensive or entrenching effect.”241 
Applying Unocal, the Chancery Court held that the Sandridge board 
failed to provide a reasonable justification for refusing to approve the 
board; therefore, the incumbent board’s actions represented a violation of 
its fiduciary duty of loyalty.242  The court found that, consistent with 
Amylin, a board violates its fiduciary duties when it fails to approve a 
dissident slate simply because it is running against the incumbent board.243  
The board must uphold the duty of loyalty and decline to approve a 
nominated slate of directors only if those candidates would pose “a material 
threat of harm to the corporation.”244  Here, the incumbent board could not 
identify a substantial risk in approving the nominated board, and approving 
the directors would not have been a breach of a contractual duty of good 
faith and fair dealing to creditors.245  As a result, the court held that the 
incumbent board was obliged to approve the new directors, regardless of its 
opinion that they were not as qualified.246  In other words, the board’s 
decision could not rest on the idea that “[they] are better than the new guys 
and gals, so keep [them] in office.”247 
The Chancery Court’s decision in Sandridge reaffirms the standard of 
review for directors’ actions in contests for corporate control, while also 
providing that a board of directors has an affirmative fiduciary duty to 
neutralize a proxy put, unless doing so would pose a substantial risk to the 
company or its creditors.248  The Chancery Court also noted its concern, as 
it did in Amylin, with directors receiving substantial economic value for 
putting these provisions into credit agreements and suggested that 
independent directors should police their use to mitigate their entrenching 
effects. 
C.  A Figurative Sword of Damocles:  
Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v. Ballantine 
The most recent discussion of dead hand proxy puts emerged in Pontiac 
General Employees Retirement System v. Ballantine249 (Healthways).  The 
case arose out of a loan agreement between Healthways, Inc. and SunTrust 
 
 241. Id. at 258 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954–55). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 246. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 260–61. 
 247. Id. at 255. 
 248. See id. at 260–61.  The court recognized that it should take into account, in a limited 
fashion, the effect that approving the slate of directors would have on creditors. See id. at 
260.  However, the directors were under no obligation to place a greater emphasis on 
creditors’ interests when deciding whether to approve the directors for purposes of the proxy 
put. See id. at 260 n.95. 
 249. No. 9789-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014).  Although the court denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, the parties ultimately settled the case out of court. See Simmons, supra 
note 126. 
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Bank.250  The agreement originally contained a continuing director proxy 
put, with no dead hand feature.251  Under this agreement, the incumbent 
board had the ability to approve a dissident slate of directors to prevent the 
acceleration of the outstanding debt with SunTrust.252  After stockholders 
pressured Healthways to declassify its board, but before a proxy contest 
was threatened or initiated, the board and SunTrust amended the loan 
agreement to contain a dead hand feature.253  Healthways continued to face 
stockholder dissatisfaction, and North Tide Capital, owner of 11 percent of 
Healthways, expressed its intent to wage a proxy contest to gain 
representation on the board.254  Shortly thereafter, Pontiac General 
Employees Retirement System (PGER), a beneficial owner of Healthways, 
made a 220 demand255 to inspect the company’s books and records and 
found nothing to suggest that Healthways received “‘extraordinarily 
valuable economic benefits’ that might justify the proxy put.”256 
1.  The Dead Hand Proxy Put 
PGER then challenged the change in control provision in the 2012 
amended agreement,257 which included dead hand language meant to 
prevent a change in control resulting from proxy solicitations.258  The 
 
 250. See Simmons, supra note 126; see also Davey & Kelly, supra note 13 (explaining 
the agreement between Healthways and SunTrust). 
 251. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 69–70. 
 252. Id. at 30–31 (discussing the additional amendment, which added the dead hand 
language to the agreement). 
 253. Id. at 68–69. 
 254. Id. at 70–71.  North Tide ultimately came to a resolution with Healthways and 
gained board seats without waging the proxy contest. Id.  Therefore, this appointment did not 
trigger the dead hand provision of the proxy put. 
 255. DGCL section 220 provides that any stockholder, upon stating his or her proper 
purpose, has a right to inspect the books and records of the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 220 (2011). 
 256. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 71. 
 257. “Change in control” is triggered in the 2012 loan agreement by a number of different 
events, including when, “during [a] period of 24 consecutive months, a majority of the 
members of the board of directors . . . of the [b]orrower cease to be composed of individuals 
who are [c]ontinuing [d]irectors.” Id. at 6. 
 258. Id.  The dead hand language appears in the definition of continuing directors, which 
the court paraphrases from the 2012 loan agreement: 
Continuing directors means, “. . . with respect to any period . . . individuals (A)  
who were members of the board . . . of the [b]orrower on the first day of such 
period, (B)  whose election or nomination to that board . . . was approved by 
individuals referred to in clause (A) . . . or (C) whose election or nomination to 
that board . . . was approved by individuals referred to in clauses (A) and (B) 
above constituting at the time of such election or nomination at least a majority of 
[the] board or equivalent governing body.” 
Id.  The definition includes the following dead hand language: 
[E]xcluding, in the case of both clauses (B) and (C), any individual whose initial 
nomination for, or assumption of office as, a member of that board or equivalent 
governing body occurs as a result of an actual or threatened solicitation of proxies 
or consents for the election or removal of one or more directors by any person or 
group other than a solicitation for the election of one or more directors by or on 
behalf of the board. 
2016] OUTLAWING DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS 2975 
provision provided that a change of control would constitute an event of 
default, giving the creditors the right to redeem their debt.259  The loan 
agreement did, however, provide that the board could approve a dissident 
slate of directors, in which case the new directors would constitute 
continuing directors and the proxy put would not be triggered.260  However, 
it made an exception for directors nominated pursuant to a proxy contest.261  
Directors nominated pursuant to a proxy solicitation would remain 
noncontinuing even if the board approved them.262  Thus, their nomination 
still would constitute a change in control, and the directors would be left 
powerless to stop the proxy put from being triggered. 
2.  Claims Against Healthways for Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
In Healthways, the Chancery Court considered claims against both 
Healthways and SunTrust, the lending institution that wrote the provision 
into the loan agreement.263  The court found that, specific to this case, the 
claim against the board for a breach of fiduciary duty in adopting the 
provision was ripe.264  The dead hand proxy put was adopted in the wake of 
increased “stockholder opposition[] and identified insurgency.”265  
Moreover, because the company had traditionally not included dead hand 
provisions in its agreement, the court was skeptical of the change in 
historical practice of the company’s debt and the lack of evidence 
suggesting that there was informed consideration for the amendment.266  
The court thus found that the dispute was sufficiently ripe as to the entry of 
the proxy put into the credit agreement because “the stockholders of the 
company are presently suffering a distinct injury in the form of the deterrent 
effect.”267 
Moreover, the court spelled out the negative implications of dead hand 
proxy puts, consistent with the skeptical views expressed in Amylin and 
Sandridge.  The court expressed distaste regarding their impact on the 
stockholder franchise and the status of the board of directors.268  Moreover, 
 
Id. at 6–7.  This dead hand provision was added in the fifth amendment and did not exist in 
the prior loan agreements. Id. at 6. 
 259. Id. at 6–7. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. at 7. 
 262. See id. (describing the dead hand language in the credit agreement). 
 263. See Davey & Kelly, supra note 13.  The Chancery Court declined to dismiss the 
stockholder challenge of the dead hand proxy put on ripeness grounds, finding that including 
a dead hand provision in the agreement may have caused present injury to the stockholders. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 71. 
 264. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 77.  The court explained that whether 
a dispute is ripe hinges on a practical assessment of “whether the interests of the party 
seeking relief outweigh the concerns of the Court in postponing review until the question 
arises in some more concrete and final form.” Id. at 72. 
 265. Id. at 76. 
 266. Id. at 75–76. 
 267. Id. at 78.  The court explained that Delaware courts have consistently found that 
disputes are ripe when there is a stockholder deterrent effect. Id. at 73. 
 268. Id. at 79–80. 
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the court recognized the deterrent effect on a shareholder’s decision to run a 
proxy contest, regardless of whether the proxy contest was already 
underway.269  The court noted that the proxy put creates a “Sword of 
Damocles”270 situation, because the shareholders will have the negative 
implications of the proxy put hanging over them when deciding to elect a 
new board.271  The court further noted the “recognized entrenching effect” 
that the dead hand provision had on the board and the restraint on the 
stockholder franchise.272 
The Delaware Chancery Court associated the dead hand proxy put with 
the dead hand poison pill in Toll Bros.273: 
The problem in Toll Brothers was that a rights plan containing a dead 
hand feature in a pill would have a chilling effect on, among other things, 
potential proxy contests such that the stockholders would be deterred, 
they would have the Sword of Damocles hanging over them, when they 
were deciding what to do with respect to a proxy contest.274 
Bringing the point home, the court further explained:  “That’s exactly what 
the effect is of the dead hand proxy put in this case.”275  The Toll Bros. 
court held that the deterrent effect of the poison pill, despite the fact that 
there was no proxy contest underway, created a legally cognizable claim.276  
In observing that the dead hand proxy put had the same deterrent effect as 
the dead hand poison pill, the Healthways court used Toll Bros. as a basis 
for denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss.277 
3.  Claims Against SunTrust for Aiding and Abetting 
The court also considered Pontiac’s claim against SunTrust for aiding 
and abetting the directors’ breach of fiduciary duty.278  SunTrust argued 
that it had legitimate business reasons for wanting the protection afforded 
by the dead hand provision.279  It further argued that one of the main 
reasons for including the provision was that, as a lender, it always wanted to 
know its borrower.280  The court, however, was skeptical of the creditor’s 
legitimate business interests and was not willing to dismiss the aiding and 
abetting claim.281  The court reasoned that this made little sense in the 
 
 269. Id. at 80. 
 270. “Sword of Damocles” is an expression used to illustrate that there is “an impending 
disaster.”  Sword of Damocles, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/sword%20of%20Damocles (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/F7VG-
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I of Syracuse, who was forced to sit under a sword that hung by a single hair. Id. 
 271. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 73. 
 272. Id. at 80. 
 273. See id. at 74; Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 274. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 74. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 277. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 74–75. 
 278. Id. at 78–80. 
 279. See id. at 25–26. 
 280. Id. at 26. 
 281. Id. at 81. 
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context of publically held companies that have annual board elections and 
frequent CEO turnovers.282  Furthermore, in the wake of Amylin and 
Sandridge, the court concluded that SunTrust was on notice that proxy puts, 
including those with a dead hand feature, were suspect due to their negative 
impact on the stockholder franchise and their management entrenchment 
effect.283 
The court also noted that bondholders have a right to enter into “arm’s-
length transaction[s]” in which they bargain for protection.284  However, it 
suggested that there are other ways for creditors to receive protection 
without using a mechanism that has such an entrenching effect on 
management.285  These include raising interest rates or demanding that the 
company obtain certain favorable financial metrics. 
The dead hand proxy put in Healthways created the same effect that the 
Amylin court categorized as overly restrictive, entrenching on management, 
and debilitating to the stockholder franchise.  The Delaware Chancery 
Court previously had expressed distaste for these provisions, which put 
such grave restrictions on the board’s ability to approve new directors who 
are appointed by means of a proxy contest.286  However, the court has yet to 
provide a per se legal analysis declaring their invalidity or limiting the use 
of proxy puts to those that do not include dead hand provisions. 
D.  The Debate Surrounding Dead Hand Proxy Puts 
This section discusses the varying uses and effects of dead hand proxy 
puts.  These proxy puts have an impact on shareholders, management, and 
creditors.  Each of these parties plays a significant role in defending or 
denouncing the use of proxy puts.  Part II.D.1 discusses how dead hand 
proxy puts effect shareholders.  Part II.D.2 focuses on how dead hand proxy 
puts affect management.  Finally, Part II.D.3 addresses their impact on 
creditors. 
1.  The Stockholder Franchise 
Dead hand proxy puts have a significant impact on stockholders’ rights, 
including their ability to wage a successful proxy contest.287  Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys argue that these provisions have the purpose and effect of 
coercing stockholders and preventing proxy contests.288  Because the 
 
 282. Id. 25–26. 
 283. Id. at 80. 
 284. Id. at 32. 
 285. Id. at 34.  The court distinguished the proxy put as “very different from a purely 
economic provision” because of the entrenching effects on management.” Id. 
 286. See generally Kallick v. Sandridge, 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013); San Antonio Fire 
& Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms. Inc., 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 287. WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 4. 
 288. See Verified Class Action Complaint, supra note 138, at 2, 13 (arguing that the risk 
of having to repay debt because of the dead hand proxy put has a coercive effect on the 
shareholders willingness to campaign for removal of the current board and to vote for 
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company’s debt will become due if a majority of the board is elected 
through a proxy contest, attorneys and commentators argue that 
stockholders are less likely to remove the board through proxy 
solicitation.289  If stockholders go through with the proxy contest, this will 
force the company to refinance its debt or renegotiate with its lenders to 
waive the provision.290  If unable to refinance or renegotiate, the company 
will face detrimental financial consequences, including the potential for a 
liquidity crisis.291  Because shareholders will not likely exercise their right 
to vote for new directors if it means financial insolvency for the company, 
the dead hand proxy put effectively protects incumbent boards from 
removal and has “eviscerating effect[s] on the stockholder franchise.”292 
Indeed, the Chancery Court in Healthways recognized the potential 
negative effects that dead hand proxy puts could have on the shareholders’ 
ability to threaten or initiate a proxy contest.293  It explained that 
prohibiting or deterring proxy contests can result in stockholder 
disenfranchisement because the presence of dead hand proxy puts promotes 
fear over changing the board of directors.294  With the dead hand 
mechanisms in place, shareholders likely will choose not to vote out an 
incumbent board because new directors will be powerless to redeem the 
dead hand proxy put. 
2.  The Entrenchment Effect 
In adopting dead hand proxy puts, creditors and directors also entrench 
incumbent directors, while appearing to serve a legitimate business 
purpose.295  Commentators suggest that “management is active in placing 
poison put covenants in indenture agreements for the purpose of 
entrenchment.”296  Furthermore, managers have substantial control over 
placing these provisions in debt agreements.297  As a result, management 
has the opportunity to adopt provisions that are self-serving and contrary to 
the interests of the corporation, the shareholders, or lenders.298 
On more than one occasion, the Delaware Chancery Court has taken the 
opportunity to note the “recognize[ed] entrenching effect” of dead hand 
proxy puts.299  The court is skeptical of the provisions because they insulate 
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directors from proxy contests, preventing stockholders from changing 
management.300  The court, however, has recognized that there are other 
purposes to the proxy put provisions and has suggested that “independent 
directors . . . monitor poison puts to ensure that they are not being adopted 
solely as entrenchment devices.”301  Bargaining to exclude them, and 
accepting them only in exchange for significant economic value, may 
provide sufficient evidence that the board did not adopt the provision for 
the purpose of entrenchment.302 
Opponents of both traditional proxy puts and dead hand proxy puts argue 
that these “director-centric poison puts” are more about entrenching 
incumbent board members than addressing the concerns of lending 
institutions.303  They further argue that proxy puts, used as hostile control 
change covenants, do not take into account whether bond values are 
adversely affected by a change in control.304  Instead, they “reflect[] an 
unabashed pursuit of management’s parochial interests.”305  Thus, these 
covenants arguably protect management, conferring only an incidental 
benefit on bondholders.306  Moreover, in some instances bond values are 
likely to improve if an inefficient board is replaced in a proxy contest.307  
Yet, the provisions in the hostile control change covenants prevent this 
improvement by limiting shareholders’ ability to remove management.308  
Management, in those instances, is protected at the expense of the 
bondholders.309 
Poison puts, as well as dead hand proxy puts, generally also may 
entrench management by deterring acquisition activity.310  In a recent study 
conducted at the University of Delaware, scholars found that “firms that had 
bonds with poison puts are less likely to be either acquirers or targets” of an 
acquisition.311  However, firms are more likely to include poison puts in 
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debt agreements if they are in industries associated with acquisition activity 
and are less likely to issue poison puts if they have other antitakeover 
provisions in place.312  “[P]oison puts are used by firms in consolidating 
industries that wish to avoid acquisition activity in general, which 
admittedly could also reflect an entrenchment effect.”313  These scholars 
acknowledged the entrenchment effect that is associated with fewer 
acquisitions, yet ultimately concluded that the use of proxy puts is primarily 
driven by bondholders’ efficient contracting considerations.314 
3.  Legitimate Business Concerns:  The Lending Institutions 
As noted above, dead hand proxy puts are contractual agreements 
involving third party creditors.315  Boards of directors include a change in 
control provision in a credit agreement or indenture in the form of a proxy 
put after negotiation with the contracting parties.  Commentators argue that 
because a proxy put is not unilaterally adopted by the board of directors, but 
rather negotiated with a third party in protection of that third party’s rights, 
the proxy put serves a legitimate business purpose.316 
With the rise of hedge fund activism, lending institutions have 
increasingly bargained to include proxy put provisions in their agreements 
to protect against activists.317  Since the beginning of 2014, nearly two 
hundred companies have struck new loan agreements that include these 
provisions.318  Lenders arguably bargain for these provisions to protect 
against “debt-financed buybacks, dividends, and restructurings, favored by 
such [activist] investors, which deteriorate credit.”319  With the surge of 
shareholder activism targeting corporate boardrooms, banks argue that 
proxy puts protect them from dissident directors who are focusing on short-
term goals that are inconsistent with the goals of the banks.320  “A few 
years ago, [the proxy put] wasn’t necessarily front of mind for most boards 
or lenders, but with the level of activism we’re seeing today, that has 
changed.”321 
Moreover, commentators also argue that the dead hand proxy put serves 
the legitimate commercial interest of a bank wanting to know its borrower 
because “[c]reditor’s don’t want to wake up one day and find out someone 
else is driving the train.”322  Knowing the borrower ensures confidence that 
business strategy will remain constant over the life of the credit 
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agreement.323  Essentially, the banks want to know who they are dealing 
with and want to avoid lending money to a board of directors that is shortly 
thereafter ousted for a new slate of directors with a completely different 
strategy for the company.324  Creditors argue that the dead hand provisions 
are the only way of providing them with the certainty of knowing that if a 
company’s board changes, they can get out of the debt agreement.325 
In the University of Delaware study discussed above, the results showed 
that including proxy puts in credit agreements was evidence of efficient 
contracting on the part of bondholders.326  The study found that a firm’s use 
of poison puts corresponded with its use of other related covenants, such as 
bond rating decline covenants, “likely reflecting bondholders with 
legitimate concerns related to acquisitions and risk shifting.”327  Finally, the 
results of this study also showed that firms that issue debt with poison puts 
have significantly higher institutional ownership, as opposed to 
individual.328  The researchers concluded that this evidenced “stronger 
external monitors—again, an explanation that is consistent with a 
governance structure complemented by contractual protections for 
bondholders . . . and inconsistent with weak governance and/or managerial 
entrenchment.”329 
However, another empirical test analyzing the function of change in 
control covenants in bond agreements concluded otherwise.330  Marcel 
Kahan and Michael Klausner found that hostile change in control 
covenants, strictly triggered by proxy contests or hostile acquisition, can 
offer substantially less protection to bondholders than covenants that are 
triggered purely by a ratings decline.331  They argued that a ratings decline 
covenant, moreover, does not discriminate between actions that 
management favors or disfavors.332  While recognizing that ratings decline 
covenants are not a perfect fix, Kahan and Klausner concluded that pure 
ratings decline covenants “provide the most complete coverage of events 
that threaten bondholders and reflect no intrusion of managerial self-
interest.”333 
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III.  DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS ARE INVALID 
AS A MATTER OF DGCL 
The legal confusion over dead hand proxy puts has caused an increase in 
litigation against both corporations and lending institutions.  In the wake of 
Healthways, plaintiffs’ attorneys continue to bring actions on behalf of 
shareholders, arguing that they are negatively affected by the use of dead 
hand proxy puts in credit agreements.334  Dead hand proxy puts are 
strikingly similar in effect to dead hand and no hand poison pills, which 
have been outlawed by the Delaware courts.335 
A comparative analysis of dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy 
puts provides a basis for suggesting that the Delaware Chancery Court 
outlaw dead hand proxy puts.  While there are recognizable differences in 
the two defense mechanisms, they have similar implications for 
shareholders’ ability to wage proxy contests, which result in management 
entrenchment.  Moreover, both ultimately have inhibiting effects on boards 
of directors’ ability to carry out their obligations under DGCL section 141.  
In light of these concerns, Part III explains the similarities and differences 
between the two mechanisms and argues that dead hand proxy puts should 
be invalidated on the same grounds that the court used in Quickturn to 
invalidate no hand and dead hand poison pills.336 
A.  Dead Hand Proxy Puts Vs. Dead Hand Poison Pills 
This part discusses the similarities and differences between dead hand 
proxy puts and dead hand poison pills.  Part III.A.1 discusses the similar 
purpose of the defense mechanisms, while Part III.A.2 focuses on their 
similar effects on the stockholder franchise.  Part III.A.3 and III.A.4 discuss 
the similar effect on management and ultimately argue for the illegalization 
of dead hand proxy puts in Delaware. 
1.  A Similar Purpose:  Takeover Defense 
When comparing dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy puts, it is 
important to consider whether the two defense mechanisms serve the same 
purpose.  The dead hand poison pill is a shareholder rights plan that a 
company adopts in connection with the threat of a tender offer or as a 
predefensive measure.337  The purpose and effect of the poison pill is to 
thwart hostile bidders.338  However, the dead hand proxy put recently has 
been used to ward off shareholder activists who want to make a change to 
the company but not acquire it.339 
While dead hand proxy puts serve as a defense against shareholder 
activism, these change in control provisions also function as a takeover 
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2016] OUTLAWING DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS 2983 
defense mechanism.340  Empirical evidence suggests that proxy puts are 
more prevalent in industries that are prone to takeovers, yet firms with 
proxy puts are less likely to be acquired.341  Moreover, firms with proxy 
puts are less likely to also have poison pills.342  This indicates that firms 
likely believe that proxy puts and poison pills serve a similar function, and 
management may use them interchangeably to serve the same purpose. 
Traditional poison puts, as discussed above, often include language that 
specifically prevents a hostile takeover.343  While dead hand proxy puts 
generally do not include such language, these proxy puts nevertheless deter 
hostile takeovers, even if that is not their explicit purpose.  For example, 
imagine a corporate raider makes a tender offer, but the company has a dead 
hand proxy put in place.  Now imagine that the same corporate raider had 
the intention of changing the board of directors, by means of a proxy 
contest, to reflect his own strategy for the company.  The dead hand proxy 
put, however, will increase the cost of the corporate raider’s acquisition.  
Specifically, this is because when he or she changes the board of directors 
through a proxy contest, the dead hand put forces the company to repay all 
of its debt.  If the acquirer cannot change the board of directors by means of 
a proxy contest, without placing this financial burden on the company, that 
acquirer likely will be deterred from acquiring the company in the first 
place.  Although the dead hand proxy put does not make a hostile takeover 
impossible,344 in the event of a successful proxy challenge it will create 
burdensome costs to the company.345 
2.  A Similar Deterrent Effect 
Continuing to compare the dead hand poison pill and the dead hand 
proxy put, both have the effect of deterring shareholders from bringing a 
proxy contest.346  In Toll Bros., the Chancery Court expressed grave 
skepticism toward dead hand poison pills.347  The court disapproved of the 
negative effects the dead hand feature had on the stockholder franchise.348  
In a takeover scenario, an acquirer often tenders an offer to buy the 
outstanding shares of the target, while at the same time initiating a proxy 
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contest to nominate a slate of directors who will redeem the pill.349  Since 
only continuing directors may redeem a rights plan that contains a dead 
hand provision, electing a new slate of directors does not stop the poison 
pill from being triggered.350  As a result, the new board is powerless to 
redeem the pill, and stockholders are more likely to vote for the incumbent 
board, which has the ability to prevent the disastrous financial effects of the 
poison pill. 
The dead hand proxy put has similar deterring effects and, thus, should 
also be found invalid.351  In Healthways, the Chancery Court likened dead 
hand proxy puts to dead hand poison pills, stating that, in both instances, 
stockholders are deterred from bringing potential proxy contests.352  The 
dead hand proxy put has the effect of disenfranchising stockholders by 
depriving them of any practical choice to vote for anyone other than the 
incumbent directors.353  Commentators argue that stockholders are not 
disenfranchised because the new board simply can refinance the debt if the 
proxy put is triggered or renegotiate with the bank to remove the proxy 
put.354  Both of these alternatives, however, can prove costly and potentially 
force the company to choose between refinancing the debt on unfavorable 
terms and suffering a liquidity crisis.355  Thus, the Chancery Court in 
Healthways correctly characterized the dead hand proxy put as creating a 
“Sword of Damocles,” whereby shareholders are deterred from threatening 
a proxy contest because of the dead hand provisions.356  The court should 
not uphold a defense mechanism with such strong implications on the 
stockholders ability to elect a new board. 
3.  A Similar Entrenchment Effect 
Disenfranchising the stockholders has the effect of entrenching 
management.  While the dead hand poison pill arguably has a greater 
entrenchment effect because it is adopted unilaterally by the board of 
directors for the sole purpose of preventing a hostile takeover, the dead 
 
 349. See supra Parts I.C.3, II.C.1. 
 350. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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hand proxy put also has a similar entrenchment effect.  The Delaware 
Chancery Court has criticized the entrenchment effects of both the dead 
hand poison pill and the dead hand proxy put.357  In the cases involving 
dead hand proxy puts and dead hand poison pills, the consequences of 
removing the incumbent board are so significant that the defense 
mechanisms serve to entrench the existing board members at the expense of 
the stockholder franchise. 
In Sandridge, the Chancery Court explicitly stated that independent 
directors should “police aspects of [proxy put] agreements . . . to ensure that 
the company itself is not offering up these terms lightly precisely because 
of their entrenching utility.”358  There, the court made clear that where there 
is a proxy put present, an incumbent board must approve the new directors 
and neutralize the proxy put unless there is a specific and substantial risk to 
the corporation or its creditors.359  Because of the preclusive language in 
dead hand proxy puts, the incumbent board does not even have the 
opportunity to approve the new directors for purposes of neutralizing the 
proxy put.  Therefore, the entrenching effects of the dead hand proxy put 
are even further reaching. 
Moreover, the dead hand proxy put is correctly categorized as an 
embedded defense masked as serving a legitimate purpose, when instead it 
functions to entrench management.360  The legitimate purpose, in the case 
of proxy puts, is arguably the protection of the creditors.361  While creditors 
do have an interest in putting dead hand proxy puts in their credit 
agreements to protect against the risk associated with a change in control, 
creditors can achieve risk reduction without using mechanisms that both 
eviscerate the stockholder franchise and entrench management.362 
Creditors argue that proxy puts are needed protection against shareholder 
activists because activists take control only to issue large dividends or issue 
more debt to afford large share buybacks.363  Creditors, however, can 
protect against activist actions in a less entrenching way.  For instance, they 
can include other covenants in their debt agreements, such as covenants that 
specifically restrict the payment of excessive dividends, limit an increase in 
the company’s outstanding debt, or prevent sale of the company’s assets 
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above a certain threshold.364  Thus, creditors can still protect themselves 
from excessive dividends or reduced liquidity using covenants other than 
dead hand proxy puts.  Covenants addressing the specific actions taken by a 
new board once an activist campaign is successful, as opposed to the 
change in control itself, can provide adequate protection for creditors, 
without entrenching management or limiting stockholders’ ability to bring a 
proxy contest. 
4.  A Similar Limiting Effect on the Board of Directors’ 
Duties Under DGCL Section 141(a) 
Not only do dead hand proxy puts have similar effects on shareholders 
and management, but, like dead hand poison pills, they also prohibit the 
board of directors from fulfilling its fiduciary duties in accordance with 
DGCL section 141(a).  In Quickturn, the Delaware Supreme Court used this 
antidisablement principle to invalidate dead hand poison pills.365  When 
considering that dead hand proxy puts have the same impact on a board in 
that they prevent the directors from taking actions that are in the best 
interest of the shareholders, the Delaware courts should outlaw dead hand 
proxy puts. 
Section 141(a) provides the board of directors with the authority to 
manage the “business and affairs” of the corporation.366  The Delaware 
court has upheld the corporate board’s statutory authority to manage the 
corporation and has expressed its “concomitant fiduciary duty pursuant to 
that statutory mandate.”367  As a result, any defense mechanism that 
prevents the board from “exercise[ing] [its] own best judgment on matters 
coming before the board” violates the duty owed to each director.368 
In Quickturn, the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the 
no hand poison pills were invalid because they prevented the newly elected 
board of directors from managing and directing the business and affairs of 
the corporation.369  There, only continuing directors could redeem the 
poison pill, and only the incumbent directors were considered continuing 
directors for purposes of redeeming the poison pill.370  As a result, the 
defense mechanism required the new board to breach its fiduciary duty any 
time it was in the best interest of the company to have the board redeem the 
pill.371  The court held that “no defensive measure can be sustained when it 
represents a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty.”372 
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The Quickturn Court further emphasized that “[t]o the extent that a 
contract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act 
in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and 
unenforceable.”373  Dead hand proxy puts are precisely such a contract.  
They are provisions, embedded in contracts, that prohibit a board from 
exercising its fiduciary duties.  When a dissident slate of directors is elected 
through a threatened or actual proxy contest, the incumbent board is 
powerless to stop the dead hand proxy put, even if it is in the best interest of 
the corporation.374 
Commentators argue that the incumbent board can renegotiate the debt or 
trigger the proxy put and then later refinance corporation’s debt.375  
However, as discussed above, these costly alternatives will not always be in 
the best interest of the company.  Directors have the authority to exercise 
their own judgment regarding the corporation’s business matters376 and thus 
should not be prevented from approving new directors to the board if doing 
so is in the corporation’s best interest.  As a result, precluding their ability 
to approve the new directors for purposes of neutralizing the dead hand 
proxy put prevents them from fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the 
corporation under section 141(a). 
While commentators argue that the use of the dead hand feature is 
necessary to make the proxy put effective,377 this argument lacks merit.  
The Delaware Chancery Court has provided a fair standard for when a 
board must approve directors for purposes of a proxy put without a dead 
hand feature.378  Based on the Chancery Court’s rulings in Amylin and 
Sandridge, a traditional proxy put, with no dead hand feature, will be 
effective in preventing a change in control only when it is in the best 
interest of the corporation and the creditors.379 
Moreover, the court’s decision to review traditional proxy puts under 
Unocal’s intermediate standard of review is appropriate given the defensive 
nature of the proxy puts and the entrenching effects that they have on 
management.380  The incumbent management, under this standard, does not 
always have to approve the new directors, but must do so if failure to 
approve them would constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty.381  In the event 
that approving the new directors creates a substantial risk to the corporation 
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or the creditors, the board of directors is not obliged to approve them.382  
This provides an adequate remedy for the board without allowing it to use 
the dead hand feature of the proxy put solely for entrenchment purposes.  
Thus, allowing the use of traditional proxy puts, without the dead hand 
feature, gives effect to change in control provisions, without violating 
DGCL section 141. 
CONCLUSION 
With the rise in shareholder activism, dead hand proxy puts are playing a 
more significant role in corporate debt agreements.  Recent Delaware 
litigation is indicative of the debate among shareholders, management, and 
creditors as to provisions’ legality.  The Delaware Chancery Court has 
recognized the harmful nature and effect of dead hand proxy puts.  The 
Chancery Court should, however, go one step further and outlaw dead hand 
proxy puts in Delaware.  Ultimately, the Chancery Court should condemn 
dead hand proxy puts as both overdeterring on shareholders and 
overentrenching on management, while upholding traditional proxy puts as 
valid under Delaware law. 
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